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Privacy is typically conceived, in both scholarly and popular 
circles, as an individual good. This weakens the potential for 
understanding the social implications of changes in privacy and 
may contribute to the topic’s marginal position within sociology. 
While not explicitly known for their conclusions about privacy, 
some of the discipline’s classic figures have addressed, in a va-
riety of ways, the relevance of privacy for social life. I highlight 
their work, neglected in privacy discourse and not well known 
within sociology, to demonstrate the sociological relevance of 
privacy for individual development, group solidarity, stratifica-
tion, and social control.
 A recent issue of Contemporary Sociology devoted its “Sympo-
sium” to surveillance studies. In this issue, five authors review the 
importance of works on surveillance and assess their position within 
the discipline. Marx (2007) notes the recent explosion of scholarly 
interest in surveillance, but focuses on its incoherence and the need 
to more clearly situate it within a broader sociological context. The 
sociology of privacy, as I see it, would provide a fitting home for 
surveillance research. Surveillance, a form of observation, is socio-
logically relevant insofar as it violates or transforms social norms 
regarding appropriate observation and leads to consequences for 
individuals and groups in terms of inequality and power. Observation 
is but one component of privacy and the experience of its invasion, 
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along with extraction and intrusion (Kasper 2005). My purpose here 
is not to dwell on the study of surveillance, but to assert that pri-
vacy—properly understood as a central topic in sociology—would 
illuminate it and other fundamental areas in the discipline.
 When delving into the contemporary discourse on privacy, one 
is confronted by an overwhelmingly diverse array of works. The 
topics to which privacy is deemed relevant include: surveillance, 
communication, feminism, the family, internet commerce, the body, 
and information—medical, financial, psychological, genetic, and 
biographical. Continuing advances in information collection and 
communications technology, along with a “war on terror,” have only 
exacerbated concerns about privacy and spurred further writing and 
opinion polls on the topic.
 Despite the status of privacy as an issue of great public concern 
and the fact that a few prominent sociologists have made important 
contributions to privacy research, the topic of privacy remains some-
what marginal within sociology. One of the main reasons for this, I 
argue, is that privacy is most often portrayed as an individual good 
that one enjoys or is deprived of on an individual basis. This narrow 
conception of privacy limits the potential to understand the wider 
implications of changes in the phenomenon of privacy and stifles a 
sociological appreciation for the social significance of privacy. My 
purpose here is to lend support to the reconceptualization of privacy 
as a social good—that which is necessary for the functioning of 
society and which is interconnected with other fundamental societal 
characteristics. This would not only enhance privacy research by 
further clarifying its subject matter, but it would also illuminate the 
sociological significance of privacy, especially in relation to indi-
vidual agency, group solidarity, stratification, and social control.
 To these ends, I first describe mounting concerns about threats 
to privacy and demonstrate its relevance as a public issue worthy 
of more explicit sociological attention. Then, I extract and empha-
size significant conclusions about privacy from classic sociology, 
drawing from the writings of Goffman, Moore, Simmel, and others. 
That I invoke sociological works in support of a claim that privacy 
is not prominent within sociology is not as ironic as it may initially 
seem. Although the works of these well known sociologists have 
167
Privacy as a Social Good
direct bearing on contemporary research, they are rarely cited in the 
privacy literature and, within sociology, their relevance for privacy 
remains largely unacknowledged. Here, I highlight their contribu-
tions to the sociological understanding of privacy— contributions 
that have been overshadowed by other themes in their work—with 
the dual intent of enhancing contemporary discourse on privacy 
and demonstrating the enduring relevance of privacy as a topic of 
sociological interest.
Privacy as an Individual Good
 Traditional connotations of privacy include the protection 
of dwellings, doors, and diaries. In 1928, Justice Louis Brandeis 
formally described privacy as “the right to be let alone, the most 
comprehensive and valued of all rights” (Brandeis 1995:206). This 
view of privacy as a negative right remains the most commonly 
referenced descriptor. When viewed as the individual’s right to 
“be let alone” the importance of privacy seems fairly puny and a 
small price to pay—or at least a price that must surely be paid—in 
exchange for security and economic gain.
 Since then, scholarly attention to privacy has grown, but there 
has been an especially rapid and dramatic increase in the past 
couple of decades. Though the authors’ concerns are extraordinarily 
diverse, they can be roughly divided into two camps: those who 
believe that we have too much privacy and need to sacrifice some of 
it for the common good and national security, and those who warn 
that the ongoing deterioration of privacy injures civil liberties and 
erodes individual freedoms. Whether arguing that it be diminished 
or protected, privacy is most often portrayed as an individual good. 
Such a view neglects, or encourages sustained ignorance of, the 
social functions that privacy serves, detracting from both sides of 
the privacy argument.
 Academics aside, the traditional framing of privacy as an in-
dividual issue in American politics threatens individual freedoms, 
while at the same time endangering the long-term health of society. 
Priscilla Regan (1995), professor of Public and International Affairs, 
addresses this directly in Legislating Privacy, arguing that defin-
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ing privacy as an individual right impoverishes political discourse 
around legislation and policy. She calls for a
need to rethink the value of privacy and to explore a path that 
has been largely uncharted in much of the philosophical thinking 
about privacy— the path that acknowledges the social importance 
of privacy . . . Privacy serves not just the individual interests but 
also common, public, and collective purposes. A recognition of 
the social importance of privacy will change the terms of policy 
debate and the patterns of interest-group and congressional 
activity (xiv).
Without diminishing the emphasis on the implications of changing 
privacy for individuals, it is essential to highlight the social im-
portance of privacy as policy surrounding it evolves—and evolve 
it has.
 In the U.S., concerns over privacy have often been piqued by 
the introduction of novel technologies, such as cameras, telephones, 
and televisions. It should be no surprise, then, that worries about 
privacy — both threats to it and threats of it — have skyrocketed 
since the 1990s and the advent of the internet, wireless, and satel-
lite technologies, the massive growth of computer networking ca-
pacities, and a host of other developments in communications and 
surveillance. Efforts to combat terrorism have intensified concern 
over the loss of privacy while providing justification for its sacrifice. 
In what follows, I discuss recent changes in concerns about privacy 
in American society.
Why Pay Attention to Privacy?
 The degree to which a person feels the desire or need for privacy 
varies considerably according to personality, social position, and 
socio-historical context. In Privacy, Barrington Moore, Jr. (1984) 
analyzes a wide range of societies that vary by population, technology, 
organization, culture, literacy, religion, and geography. He finds that, 
generally, privacy is minimal where social organization and technol-
ogy are minimal, but that “at least a desire for privacy [is] a panhuman 
trait” (276). While every person does not feel identical privacy needs, 
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a desire for privacy is widely shared and an imbalance — whether 
too much or too littl — invites disharmony and dysfunction.
 Practices surrounding privacy, and the degree to which people 
feel a need for it, have undergone dramatic changes in U.S. society. 
Throughout the 20th century, privacy invasion became more salient 
as a public issue. Scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s began to reflect 
mounting concern for the loss of privacy (Carrington and Lambie 
1976; LeMond and Fry 1975; Packard 1964; Raines 1974; Rule 
et al. 1980; Smith 1979; Westin 1967). Most were unwavering in 
their assertions that privacy was in danger, and their conclusions 
have since been confirmed.
 In addition to increasing privacy invasions in the form of infor-
mation collection and exchange, spam, identity theft, biometrics, air 
travel policy, nanotechnology, drug, personality, and psychological 
testing, communications interception, and surveillance at work, 
there has been a pronounced expansion of surveillance in public 
spaces. Bill Brown, founder of the privacy advocacy group The 
Surveillance Camera Players, estimates that there are about 6,000 
cameras scattered throughout Manhattan (Smithsimon 2003:44). 
Charles Ramsey, D.C. police chief, explains the potential surveil-
lance power of the station’s network of cameras when he states, “We 
have a total of 12 cameras, but we’re able to connect with existing 
networks of cameras from both the Virginia Department of Trans-
portation, Maryland Department of Transportation, and our own 
District of Columbia Department of Transportation” (Close Watch 
2002). He admits that the number of cameras they can hook into 
is “practically unlimited” (Close Watch 2002). Stephen Gaffigan, 
head of the Washington Metropolitan Police Department project, in 
discussing the new system that links hundreds of existing cameras 
to new digital cameras, reports that the department is intrigued by 
the British model, where more than two million cameras have been 
placed throughout the country in recent years (D.C. Cops 2002).
 Privacy specialists call a tendency toward greater surveillance 
over time a “ratchet-up effect” (Swire 2004). Peter Swire, professor 
of law and long-standing White House privacy advisor, explains 
that, throughout the legislative process, privacy advocates and law 
enforcement lobbyists are at odds with each other. Though each side 
Social Thought & Research
170
proposes new laws that will further their respective causes, there 
tends to be a canceling out effect that preserves the status quo and 
blocks controversial provisions. This balance continues until a crisis 
strikes, at which time there are strong pressures to “do something” 
Immediately after September 11, 2001, Swire (2004) explains, the 
USA Patriot Act was quickly drafted by assembling previously dor-
mant pro-law enforcement provisions from earlier proposals, but it 
contained none of the pro-privacy proposals. “Notably,” he adds, “it 
also contained a number of items from the law enforcement ‘wish 
list’ that had been omitted in the 2000 proposal” (2004:4). He notes 
a similar pattern after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center 
and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, after which legislation that 
increased law enforcement powers was also swiftly passed.
 Tensions exist within citizens’ desires as well as among legisla-
tors’ motives. People generally support higher security, as well as 
measures to reduce the risk of a total surveillance society. Swire 
states, however, that the default position is greater surveillance. 
Robert O’Harrow (2005) agrees, explaining in ABC’s Primetime 
Live No Place to Hide that any resistance is “episodic and ad hoc” 
and that the drive continues to be in the direction of more monitor-
ing, data collection, and analysis. While people may not be aware 
of the specifics in the ongoing battles over privacy, public opinion 
polls reveal that they have a distinct sense of the tendencies toward 
more surveillance and less privacy (Kasper 2005). This sense is 
made more salient through mass media features like Reader’s 
Digest (“The Scary New Threat to Your Privacy,” July 2004 and 
“Security v. Privacy: Where Do You Stand,” February 2005) and 
news programs like ABC’s Primetime Live (“No Place to Hide: 
Freedom and Identity,” January 2005). 
 The overall understanding of what is private has been trans-
formed. This is apparent in the types of privacy invasions being 
committed. Whereas privacy invasions were once dominated 
by transparent and discrete offenses, trespasses are increasingly 
unseen, unknown, and ongoing. No longer delineated by tangible 
physical barriers, it is now one’s information, thoughts, and move-
ments that primarily occupy the realm of privacy. Moreover, privacy 
is increasingly being invaded by the government and corpora-
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tions—powerful social agents over which individuals have little 
control (Kasper 2005). Though the loss of privacy is not perfectly 
quantifiable, the feeling is palpable and has become a social fact 
with important consequences.
 Escalating concern over privacy is evident in the growing num-
bers of books dedicated to the issue of privacy. According to Books 
in Print,1 87 books were published with privacy as a keyword in the 
25 years between 1955 and 1979. Between 1980 and 2005, there 
were 1,225 such books published, 1,105 of them since 1990.2 The 
number of organizations whose mission is to provide information 
about and protect people’s privacy has also grown.3 
 Despite this flurry of activity, there is a surprising absence of 
attention to the issue of privacy in mainstream sociology. Employ-
ing Ingenta (an online academic journal resource) to search the 
discipline’s top journals (American Sociology Review, American 
Journal of Sociology, Social Problems, Social Forces, and Socio-
logical Theory) between 2001 and 2006, one finds no articles with 
the term “privacy” in the title, in the abstract, or as a keyword. In 
fact, according to a JSTOR search, there has not been an article 
featuring “privacy” in the title in one of these journals since 1968 
(AJS was the last). The Annual Review of Sociology, intended to 
provide examinations of scholarly advances and synthesize the 
developing literature within a discipline, shows that between 1930 
and 2006 there have been zero articles featuring “privacy” in the 
title or abstract (for which data are available since 1994). By con-
trast, more recently coined terms and specific areas of interest have 
made their way into the annual review (see Table 1 on page 172). 
Given the salience of privacy as a social issue, its absence in ARS 
is surprising.
 It is unclear whether the framing of privacy as an individual 
issue is the cause or the effect of privacy’s absence in mainstream 
sociology scholarship. What is evident is that while privacy has not 
been included in the discipline’s central topics, sociologists have 
not been completely silent on the matter either. A number of key 
figures have addressed the societal importance of privacy, but their 
insights have gone unnoticed in both sociology and in the privacy 
literature.
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Classic Sociology on Privacy
 Employing the observations of key sociologists, as well as 
those of other contemporary scholars, I demonstrate privacy’s 
sociological significance for individual agency, group solidarity, 
stratification systems, and social control. Though neglected, their 
conclusions have direct bearing on contemporary questions about 
privacy and also provide a useful basis from which to pursue further 
sociological study of privacy.
Privacy and Individual Development
 The vitality of any society is only as good as the people who 
comprise and animate it. Opportunities for individual development 
depend on some degree of privacy in the form of solitude, anonym-
ity, and temporary releases from social duties. The need for privacy 
is socially created, determined by the social pressures, obligations, 
intrusive demands, or unwanted companionship one experiences 
as a member of society. Moore (1984) succinctly states,
Without society, there would be no need for privacy. The need 
is a consequence of the fact that in order to survive, indeed to 
 Inequality 18
 Gender 16
 Race 10
 Globalization 10
 Immigration 9
 Social capital 2
 Environmental sociology 2
 Postmodernism 1
 Queer 1
 Privacy 0
Table 1.  Search term results in Annual Review of Sociology article 
titles, 1930-2006
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be or become human, men and women must live in society. For 
that purpose, they are imperfectly endowed by their natural or 
physiological and psychological equipment. Inevitably, life in 
human society imposes frustrations even if it is also on occasion 
a source of satisfaction and even great happiness. Since societies 
differ, the desire or need for privacy will vary historically, from 
one society to another and among different groups in the same 
society (73).
In essence, one’s mere membership in society inspires a desire or 
felt need for varying degrees of privacy, which is integral to one’s 
psychological, emotional, spiritual, and intellectual development.
 Privacy is central to one’s development of autonomy, problem 
solving skills, and communicative capacity. We use private time to 
organize our interpretations about daily thoughts, behaviors, and 
our place in society. Goffman (1981) uses the term “self-talk” to 
describe the process by which people talk aloud to themselves to 
review their activities, rehearse or re-live interactions, judge, en-
courage, or blame themselves about what they are doing or have 
done, and verbally mark breaks and new beginnings in their physical 
activities (79). Self-talk, Goffman argues, is essential preparation for 
communication with others in addition to serving a “self-guidance 
function.” This is especially true for children, but it “is not merely 
a transitional feature of primary socialization” (Goffman 1981:82). 
In other words, although we are more likely to see children exhibit 
this behavior, adults regularly perform self-talk as a means to guide 
themselves through difficult tasks and as ongoing preparation for 
social encounters. For adults, however, it is not socially acceptable 
behavior. If caught self-talking, one will, most likely, immediately 
stop or risk being seen as eccentric or insane. The rule “no talking 
to oneself in public” is implicit, at least in American society, but it 
is also generally understood that talking to oneself is an acceptable 
practice if restricted to the confines of solitude. The only currently 
permissible venue for the necessary activity of self-talk, then, is in 
private.
 Intellectual activity, discovery, experimentation, and creation 
all require the opportunity for time alone. Moore (1984) associates 
this particular type of privacy need with modern societies in which 
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professions have come to be indispensable. Without sciences, schol-
arship, and the arts, he contends, society would grind to a halt. “The 
development of talent requires peace and quiet [and] . . . opportuni-
ties for reflection. In a word,” Moore continues, “one needs privacy 
both to acquire professional skills and to exercise them” (1984:76). 
Janna Malamud Smith (2001) puts it this way: “Our psyches are 
permeable membranes. When we come in contact with others, we 
tend to absorb feelings, thoughts, moods, and opinions” (10). This 
requires sorting through all that one has taken in to review, evalu-
ate, worry over, and draw conclusions about it. Privacy, provided 
by the moments one has alone, enables one to reason, think, relax, 
produce, and make choices free of the distractions that others intro-
duce. Psychological research supports the idea that only in private 
can individuals express themselves free of inhibition (Friedman and 
Miller-Herringer 1991; Friesen 1972; Sundstrom, Burt, and Kamp 
1980). Experiments show that people with more complicated jobs 
are much more satisfied in private spaces, but for all types of jobs 
studied, “participants generally preferred privacy over accessibil-
ity.”4 When given privacy, people can control overload, and “can 
tend less to maintaining appearances and more to getting the job 
done” (Sundstrom, Burt, and Kamp 1980:114).
 On the other hand, too much privacy would do great damage to 
individuals and the social worlds they inhabit, impeding individual 
development in other ways and rendering futile any possibility of a 
social world. Excessive solitude, especially if unwanted, can make 
a person feel isolated and out of touch with reality. Worse, solitude 
and anonymity may provide occasion for dangerous behaviors, in-
cluding deception, insult, crime, and assault. These levels of social 
isolation can also increase the risk of victimization as the ability and 
willingness of a community to protect its members is undermined. 
Too much privacy may lead to self-involvement so excessive that it 
compromises one’s attention to social responsibilities. As Goffman 
(1981) tells us, “there are no circumstances in which we can say, 
‘I’m sorry, I can’t come right now, I’m busy talking to myself’” 
(81). Taken to the extreme, Moore concludes, it ends in a “pathol-
ogy of privacy,” where individuals and corporate “persons” feel 
free to do whatever they want without regard for the well-being of 
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others. Likewise, too little privacy disallows many of the processes 
essential for individual development, stunting the potential growth 
of society’s members and thus of society itself.
Privacy and Social Solidarity 
 Sociologists tend to insist that group solidarity depends pri-
marily on the regular assembly of group members and, on a larger 
societal scale, on the connections and dependencies among them. 
Though some form of togetherness is important for group identity 
and unity, regular parting is equally necessary for the maintenance of 
group relations. Privacy, in terms of being able to limit contact with 
others, is just as important in the formation and functioning of group 
relationships as is actual contact time between group members. At 
some point, the presence of others becomes annoying, irritating, 
or oppressive. Barry Schwartz (1968), in “The Social Psychology 
of Privacy,” argues, “rules governing privacy, then, if accepted by 
all parties, constitute a common bond providing for periodic sus-
pension of interaction” (742). The formation and maintenance of 
social relationships depend on discretion, concealment, and retreat 
as much as on openness, revelation, and coming together.
 Relationships between individuals depend on mutual knowl-
edge of each other. They require an exchange of information—both 
personal and practical—and necessitate that each party reveal parts 
of his or her self. However, relationships are also built on a mutual 
non-knowledge of one another. What is taboo or off limits will vary 
across time and place, but such non-knowledge remains essential 
to the formation, development, and maintenance of social relations. 
People require privacy, in the sense of control over the information 
they release, to form social relationships. Simmel (1967) has ad-
dressed this phenomenon most extensively when he writes, “One 
can never know another person absolutely, which would involve 
knowledge of every single thought and mood” (308). Some of this 
limitation is due to the barriers of our finite abilities of expressing 
and sensing. But much of what we cannot see of another is due to 
his or her deliberate withholding. The unity of person visible to 
others is the portion that one permits others to see, the result of 
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a conscious and ongoing process of selection, stylization, and ar-
rangement. Simmel (1967) proclaims, “we simply cannot imagine 
any interaction or social relation or society which are not based 
on this teleologically determined non-knowledge of one another” 
(312).
 Simmel (1967) examines different types of social relationships 
and the degrees of reciprocal knowledge that participants enjoy. 
From the gesellschaft (interest groups and acquaintances) to the 
gemeinschaft (friendship, love, and marriage), he argues that, to 
varying degrees, each type of relation depends on the ability to 
conceal certain things. Especially in modern complex societies, 
“interaction, solidarity, and the pursuit of common purposes do 
not depend on everybody’s psychological knowledge of everybody 
else” (317). Relationships of acquaintance imply the duty of dis-
cretion, “to renounce the knowledge of all that the other does not 
voluntarily show us” (323). In these relations, it is acceptable for 
one to learn about others through observation and reflection. How-
ever, using means beyond that — eavesdropping, reading another’s 
mail and even intentionally using one’s psychological superiority 
to infer and draw conclusions about a person — is indiscretion, an 
invasion of privacy and a destructive force in such relationships.
 In more gemeinschaft relationships, the accent, Simmel (1967) 
says, “is more on the degree of knowledge than of ignorance” (324). 
Friendship, for instance, rests on connections between people vari-
ously based on affection, spirituality, recreation, and intellect, or 
some combination thereof. Nevertheless, for the most part, each 
friendship depends on the exposure to select aspects of personal-
ity. “All the friendships,” Simmel argues, “present a very peculiar 
synthesis in regard to the question of discretion, of reciprocal 
revelation and concealment” (326). 
 Modern marriage (and other long term relationships) presents 
difficulty in determining the extents to which revelation and re-
straint play a role. This type of intimate relationship tempts one 
to reveal everything, with no effort toward concealment. In most 
cases, Simmel (1967) argues, such abandon seriously threatens the 
future of the relationship (307-329). Modern conventions regarding 
marriage and romantic relationships support this. Magazines, talk 
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shows, and self-help books have long advised spouses and partners 
(particularly women) to maintain mystery in order to attain and sus-
tain relationships. Internet dating advisers, for example, admonish 
women for forgetting “to keep the mystery in our relationships,” 
instruct men in “how to use mystery to attract a woman,” and teach 
teenagers that “an air of mystery can be provocative and appealing 
to a man.”5 Though these examples may seem frivolous, they reflect 
an enduring conventional wisdom about the discretion called for 
in romantic relationships. 
 Thanks to Goffman (1997), the idea that all social interaction 
depends upon the maintenance of front and back regions in which 
impressions are regulated and time released is commonplace in 
sociology. Without the cycles of the regular withdrawal from 
the public eye, which provide periodic release from having to 
perform in view of others, and participation through role playing 
and impression management out front, genuine social life would 
not be possible. For Goffman (1997), there are three general types 
of territories: fixed (geographical in nature, in which claimants’ 
attachment is supported legally), situational (particular to equip-
ment or setting, whether owned publicly or privately, and claimed 
only when in use), and egocentric (preserves which move with the 
claimant and of which they are the center). It is only through the 
mutual understanding and respect of these various forms of privacy 
that social groups remain coherent or function at all.
 Likewise, Schwartz (1986) discusses the group-preserving 
functions of privacy and argues that social relationships would 
self-terminate without the periodic relief of privacy. A “withdrawal 
into privacy is often a means of making life with an unbearable (or 
sporadically unbearable) person possible” (Schwartz 1968:741). 
Schwartz claims that there is a limit to which interaction is endur-
able for the parties involved and that “a mutual agreement to part 
company, is no less a binding agent than the ritual meeting” (742). 
One desires privacy from others because, as Moore (1984) puts 
it, “their presence has become overly demanding, oppressive, or 
simply boring” (72). This is an experience to which, presumably, 
every social being can relate. In American society, norms loosely 
regulate when groups (whether formal or informal) will meet, how 
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often, and for how long. The violation of these norms makes them 
more salient and tends to inspire hostility. It is not uncommon for 
close friends or spouses to seek time apart from one another, albeit 
temporarily. Though society is necessary for humans and can be a 
source of satisfaction and joy, it can equally be a source of frustra-
tion and tension. As such, humans organize means of withdrawing 
from it, for a time. The degree of withdrawal varies according to 
perceived demands of society and the need for a respite from them. 
Periods of togetherness and release are structured into social life 
for the long term health of groups and social solidarity.
 The need for privacy partially stems from the perceived differ-
ential between the benefits derived from belonging to society and 
the costs of social obligations. While an excess of privacy can result 
in loneliness or social dysfunction, not allowing enough privacy 
to members of social groups can breed animosity, exhausts public 
energy, and exerts detrimental consequences on group solidarity. 
Schwartz (1968) confirms that, “guarantees of privacy . . . must be 
established in any stable social system” (742). Privacy is a socially 
created need, and without society, there would be no need for pri-
vacy. Given this, Schwartz (1968) offers the paradoxical insight 
that, since privacy presupposes the existence of social relations, 
the degree to which privacy is employed in a society might serve 
as a telling index of solidarity.
Privacy and Stratification
 The manner in which privacy is allocated or obtained in a 
society is partially determined by one’s position and power in the 
social hierarchy. The higher up one sits, generally, the more privacy 
one is capable of attaining.6 Recognizing this, an analysis of how 
privacy is distributed and used can reveal much about systems of 
inequality and power. Specifically, looking carefully at how privacy 
is guaranteed (or not) and to whom can indicate the sort of power 
balance, or imbalance, that exists.
 Universally, children tend to be low in the social hierarchy and 
are accorded little power. Lacking the ability to care for themselves, 
babies and small children have no privacy. Their basic bodily func-
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tions—feeding, diapering, bathing, and so forth—are attended to 
by others. As they age, their status and power—at least within the 
structure of the family—increases, as does their privacy. They may 
begin to exercise greater autonomy over their daily decisions (what 
to eat, what to wear, what to play and with whom). By the age of 
four or five, children attend to their own bathroom needs, dress 
themselves, and are given time alone to play. The privacy accorded 
them, at least in the U.S., continues to increase until teenagers begin 
to spend greater amounts of time out of parents’ sight, taking care 
of their own bodily needs, controlling their own means of com-
munication, and occupying their own personal spaces.
 Socially, privacy tends to be positively correlated with wealth 
and luxury. In other words, privacy costs. Historically, those with 
the means to do so acquire a place in which to withdraw from oth-
ers, and those without the means comprise the masses, who must 
live huddled together for safety, warmth, or lack of space. Schwartz 
(1968) points out that “privacy is an object of exchange,” bought 
and sold as a commodity to those who can pay. A most conspicuous 
example is “in public restrooms where a dime will purchase a toilet, 
and a quarter, a toilet, sink, and mirror. In some public lavatories 
a free toilet is provided—without a door” (Schwartz 1968:743). 
Gated communities, answering services, doormen, and the like 
provide opportunities for privacy, which continue to be available 
only to those who can afford them.
 The stratification reflected in and perpetuated by privacy is 
built into physical structures. Class stratification, for instance, is 
evident in home architecture. Upper class homes tend to contain 
more spaces, divisions, and rooms that provide opportunities for 
seclusion than do the residences of the lower classes, the working 
poor, and especially those living in poverty. In The Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1959) addresses the class inequal-
ity of front and back stages when he writes, “The bathroom and 
bedroom, in all but lower-class homes, are places from which the 
downstairs audience can be excluded” (123). Bodies are cleansed, 
clothed, and made up for presentation to others in these private 
spaces. Such divisions distinguish upper, middle, and lower class 
living. 
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 Occupationally, one’s position is usually reflected in one’s 
physical situation and the manner in which it either protects privacy 
or allows for its invasion. Those of higher rank get private offices 
(some at the very top even warrant off-premises work spaces), while 
lower ranking employees spend their time in more visible spaces. 
This is especially evident today in the open-concept, cubicle design 
of office space, but the discrepancy in privacy is not limited to white 
collar work. Occupational privacy tends to increase as one moves up 
the organizational hierarchy. The lower one’s status and power, the 
less able one is to protect one’s privacy or to avoid its invasion in 
other ways such as drug, psychological, or personality tests, locker 
and purse searches, strip searches, and the like. In her book, Nickel 
and Dimed, Barbara Ehrenreich (2000) describes her job as a clean-
ing woman in which the boss “encourages us to imagine that we are 
under surveillance at all times in each house” (93). In her Wal-Mart 
experience, she relates how drug and personality tests make the 
prospective employee “feel . . . down, way down, like a supplicant 
with her hand stretched out” (Ehrenreich 2000:150). The tests and 
hiring practices in jobs like these tilt the playing field, removing 
the possibility of confronting the employer as an equal and a free 
agent. Employers can demand tests of employees or interviewers, 
but not the other way around. Students’ lockers and backpacks are 
subject to search at any time, but students cannot look into teachers’ 
desks or break into principals’ offices. The punishment increases 
with the status of the trespasser. The relationship between privacy 
and social power position is clear.
 In The Panoptic Sort, communications specialist Oscar Gandy 
(1993) discusses the ever-growing information gathering struc-
ture as a stratifying mechanism. The “panoptic sort” refers to the 
“complex technology that involves the collection, processing, and 
sharing of information about individuals and groups that is gen-
erated through their daily lives . . . and is used to coordinate and 
control their access to goods and services that define life in the 
modern capitalist economy” (Gandy 1993:15). The relative power 
of individuals within this economy of personal information is slight 
compared with that of governmental and corporate entities. One’s 
location in the hierarchy of such organizations garners one more 
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or less privacy than others—the higher one’s position in terms of 
class, status, and political clout, the greater the ability to protect 
one’s privacy. “If a person is not able to determine who does and 
does not have access to the realms that they define as their own, 
they are by definition less than whole” (Gandy 1993:186).
 Foucault’s classic assertion that knowledge is power is con-
firmed in Gandy’s panoptic sort. In today’s massive database infor-
mation system, those who do the information gathering—corpora-
tions and the government—wield the most power. The inability to 
keep information private represents a lack of power. Conversely, 
more powerful people and organizations have a greater capacity to 
keep secrets. Weber addresses the relationship of secrecy and power 
in his discussions of bureaucracy. “The tendency toward secrecy in 
certain administrative fields follows their material nature: every-
where that the power interests of the domination structure toward 
the outside are at stake, whether it is an economic competitor of a 
private enterprise, or a foreign, potentially hostile polity, we find 
secrecy” (Weber 1946:233). Affording less privacy to others while 
ensuring one’s own privacy, even to the point of secrecy, not only 
reduces others’ power, but also increases one’s own power.
 Privacy, which is an integral component in social stratifica-
tion and power structures, is too often overlooked in stratification 
research. A fruitful way to learn more about the stratification of 
a social system would be to analyze how privacy operates in it. 
Whose privacy is most often invaded, how and by whom? To whom 
is the most privacy allocated and what forms does it take? What 
sorts of power does privacy ensure in this system? Sociologists 
are accustomed to looking at money, status, and political clout 
when evaluating the degree to which a society or social group is 
stratified. I suggest that privacy can serve as a useful dimension in 
understanding power structures and the allocation of other resources 
in a society.
Privacy and Social Control
 Privacy has long been a tool of social control. Its removal is 
a form of punishment used to regulate the behavior of individuals 
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and groups, as in penal institutions, concentration camps, and to-
talitarian societies. The classic example is Bentham’s panopticon. 
When applied to a prison, the design creates an atmosphere in 
which a convict might be observed at any time without his or her 
knowledge. This is supposed to produce, in the inmates, a strong 
system of self-policing which would increase the efficiency and 
efficacy of prisons. Elaborating on this theme, Foucault develops 
the hypothesis that continuous disciplinary surveillance at work 
and in other settings cultivates the internalization of those social 
controls once imposed from without. He argues that power is not 
something one has, but rather something one has the means to 
exercise. He recognizes the relationship between surveillance and 
these means when he writes, “The techniques that make it possible 
to see induce effects of power” (1977:170-71).
 F. W. Taylor developed an elaborate philosophy of workplace 
organization designed to increase control, efficiency, and productiv-
ity. He relied heavily on surveillance of his employees and compiled 
dossiers on the men he sought to “break.” He strove to control labor 
through knowledge. His theory remains the foundation of work 
design, and such practices remain ubiquitous today (Parenti 2003). 
Office workers increasingly find themselves occupying spaces that 
allow easy observation by superiors. Surveillance at work takes 
myriad forms, including cameras, surveillance of internet activity, 
monitoring the frequency of telephone conversations and the calls 
themselves, intercepting email, and measuring productivity through 
physical activities like key stroke speed and error frequency. In his 
study of the organizational use of EPMCSs (electronic performance 
monitoring and control systems), Bradley Alge (2001) finds that 
nearly 80% of workplaces monitor their employees in some respect. 
Employees perceive this loss of control as an explicit invasion of 
privacy. The more invasive the practices become, the greater the 
degree of social control.
 Many privacy scholars see today’s information industry, com-
prised of both public and private entities, as one of the most signifi-
cant forces in escalating social control. Parenti (2003) outlines the 
development of the relationship between surveillance, information, 
and social control. Identification, he says, was the original source of 
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control in the form of the written slave pass, organized slave patrols, 
and “wanted” posters for runaways. These technologies were used 
to limit slaves’ opportunities for mobility, developing social net-
works, and for gaining literacy. Parenti (2003) extends his argument 
of identification as control to include modern digital surveillance. 
In this analysis, he describes the development of photography and 
early biometrics (bodily measurements, markers, handprints and 
fingerprints) as “the emerging architecture of the soft cage of total 
surveillance” (2003:78). What is most frightening about this system, 
Parenti claims, is that it is so mundane. We carry and use a variety 
of items that log our movements and lifestyle more efficiently than 
in the past. In isolation, each credit card, social security number, 
ATM card, grocery club card, drivers license, and so on, seems 
benign, but “each new camera, database, or ID operates in relation 
to a larger society wide momentum toward increased observation” 
(Parenti 2003:78).
 After careful analysis of the evolving information industry, 
James Rule et al. (1980) outline the trend toward social control and 
assert that the rationalization accompanying modern information 
systems is directly responsible for increased control over people. 
In addition to its function of stratification, this panoptic sort is also 
a “system of disciplinary surveillance…guided by a generalized 
concern with rationalization of social, economic, and political sys-
tems” (Gandy 1993:15). As large organizations work to minimize 
risk and maximize profit, they use information about people to rank 
them in useful ways, thereby determining their opportunities and 
controlling which behaviors will be rewarded or punished.
 Smithsimon (2003) writes about what she calls the “surveillance 
state,” elucidating how the ubiquitous surveillance camera breaks 
and alters social norms of human observation and information 
gathering. Since expectations of privacy hinge on social norms, 
and one’s expectations determine legal definitions of privacy, then 
the very act of invading privacy causes privacy to shrink. Ongoing 
surveillance in public places not only invades people’s privacy, but 
also works to diminish expectations of privacy and thus the extent 
to which privacy is legally protected. “Video monitored space[s] 
feel controlled, not free and public” (Smithsimon 2003:47). Public 
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surveillance—via cameras, curfews, barricades, fences, and motion 
detectors—exercises social control by inhibiting the activities in 
which people feel free to engage, especially political activities.
 In the extreme, social controls are intended to eradicate private 
life in the interest of maximizing the control of those in power. 
Soviet society, for example, called on citizens to police each other 
and to recognize no space apart from the Party (Kharkhordin, 1983; 
Timasheff, 1946). In early 1960s Yugoslavia, Josip Novakovich 
(2001) describes the overall attitude that group life was state en-
forced, and privacy was anathema. “We were a society of gazers,” 
he explains (24). The spies were both employed and unemployed, 
formal and informal. Their eyes were everywhere, yet no one knew 
exactly where.
 The concentration camp also exhibits the purposeful elimination 
of privacy and the consequential dehumanization of the inmates. 
Primo Levi (1989) recounts the degradation of being forced to use 
the collective latrine, the coerced nudity, and the regular ritual of 
bodily inspection.
. . . A naked and barefoot man feels that all his nerves and ten-
dons are severed: he is helpless prey . . . [he] no longer perceives 
himself as a human being but rather as a worm . . . he knows that 
he can be crushed at any moment (113-114).
He recalls how moments alone in such camps, although precious and 
rare, had a profound effect on one’s ability to think and feel. “We 
had lived for months and years at an animal level…and any space 
for reflection, reasoning, [and] experiencing emotions was wiped 
out” (1989:75). This total form of social control is a resounding 
theme in fiction, as well, the exemplar of which is Orwell’s 1984. 
In such totalitarian societies, a complete loss of privacy lends itself 
to the near-complete control of people by the powers that be.
 An examination of privacy arrangements can teach us much 
about social control. Who exerts control and over whom? How 
and in what circumstances? The manner in which social control is 
wielded, particularly regarding privacy norms and rights, reveals 
something important about its balance (or imbalance) with individu-
al autonomy. There are dangers to the kind of anonymity that a lack 
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of social control in the form of excessive privacy could introduce, 
but as Parenti argues, “the risks of omniscient and omnipotent state 
and corporate power are far worse” (2003:212). The potential risks 
of an over-controlled society include social disintegration through 
the elimination of trust, the weakening of social relationships, and 
the disappearance of freedoms to think, speak, and act in ways not 
dependent on or approved by the reigning systems of ideology, 
class, and assessment.
Conclusion
 Changes in perceptions of privacy and practices surrounding 
it have enormous sociological significance. One need not rely on 
the mysterious notion of an inherent need for privacy to be certain 
of this; rather, evidence of this need can be found in the structures 
of group life. As Merton (1968) points out, variations in humans’ 
need for privacy are products of the variation in “functionally op-
timum degree[s] of visibility” among social structures (399). These 
“social structures require arrangements for insulation from full and 
uninhibited visibility if they are to function adequately” (Merton 
1968:398). In short, Merton concludes, “limits upon full visibility 
of behavior are functionally required for the effective operation 
of a society” (1968:399). Habermas (1998) also recognizes the 
fundamental importance of privacy for developing, maintaining, 
and protecting society. Communication in the public sphere is only 
possible, he argues, when there are distinct boundaries around 
private autonomy. Public forms of communication depend on “the 
spontaneous inputs from a lifeworld whose core private domains are 
intact” (Habermas 1998:417). In this way, “a well-secured private 
autonomy helps ‘secure the conditions’ of public autonomy just as 
much as, conversely, the appropriate exercise of public autonomy 
helps ‘secure the conditions’ of private autonomy” (Habermas 
1998:408).
 The observations of key sociologists reflect the awareness—
either explicit or implicit—that privacy is not just something to be 
had by, or taken away from, individuals. On the contrary, privacy is 
a social good. The way that this type of social good is understood 
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and organized in society impacts social life in profound ways, 
especially in the areas of personal development, group solidarity, 
stratification, and social control. Measures of privacy could be an 
important tool for better understanding these social phenomena.
 The current exploration of privacy as a social good is not 
exhaustive; rather, one could identify additional roles that privacy 
plays in the organization of social life. The present discussion is but 
a step toward lending necessary sociological support to efforts to 
reconceptualize privacy in a way that appreciates its social signifi-
cance, and an important step toward advancing privacy scholarship. 
By fostering awareness of what sociology’s forebears have had 
to say, the discipline will be better equipped to contribute useful 
insights into the social implications of privacy.
Notes
 1 http://www.booksinprint.com/bip/ 
 2 The increase cannot solely be attributed to an increase in the num-
ber of books published. Compared to all other adult, non-fiction books 
published in the U.S., the number of books identified with privacy as 
a keyword has been consistently rising in recent decades. Contrasting 
the 25 year periods of 1955-1979 and 1980-2004 shows that the number 
of all books being published has increased by more than 700%; that is, 
there are more than seven times as many books published in the latter 
period than in the former. Nevertheless, the increase in privacy books 
between those two periods is twice that, or greater than 14 times that 
of the previous period. Looking at more recent five-year increments 
reveals that the number of all books published has steadily increased, 
but that the rates at which privacy books appear are higher still. See 
table below.
 5-Year Period (% increase from the previous 5-year period)
  All books Privacy books
  
 2000-2004 +122% +153%
 1995-1999 +143% +238%
 1990-1994 +129% +209%
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 3 An abridged selection of some of the more well known includes: 
Privacy International, Electronic Frontier Foundation, U.S. Privacy Coun-
cil, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Privacy Forum, Electronic Privacy 
Information Center, Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Consumers Against 
Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering, Coalition Against Unso-
licited Commercial Email, Private Citizen, Privacy Exchange, Privacy 
Foundation, Privacy Inc., and Privacy News, Information, and Action. 
All of these groups have been created since 1990, and most of them much 
more recently than that.
 4 Italics in original.
 5 Respectively, these come from: loveletterbox.com, seductioninsider.
com, and myattractiveinfoforteens.blogspot.com.
 6 This is not without exception. It is possible for people of humble 
means to live in isolation from society, in this way achieving a form of 
privacy. Celebrities and politicians, occupying higher positions status, may 
have difficulty evading the watchful eyes and ears of a public that feels 
entitled to know things about them that it would not demand of the average 
citizen. At the same time, however, they tend to have greater resources with 
which to both “escape” and to exert influence over their public images.
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